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Articles 
The EU Emissions Trading Scheme and the Court of Justice:  The 
͞High PolitiĐs͟ of IŶdireĐtly ProŵotiŶg Gloďal “taŶdards 
 





A.  Overview 
 
The European Union (EU) Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS) is a cornerstone of the European 
Union's policy to combat climate change and its key tool for the cost-effective reduction of 
industrial greenhouse gas emissions.  Moreover, according to the European Commission, it 
is the first and biggest international scheme for the trading of greenhouse gas emission 
allowances, including sophisticated and far-reaching penalties.
1
  Notably, however, the 
scheme arose out of a failure at the international level to agree on global standards.  When 
an amended directive included aviation under this scheme beginning in 2012,
2
 it ignited a 
global controversy that came before the Grand Chamber of the Court of Justice in 
December 2011.
3
  In its decision, the Court and Advocate General explicitly explain that the 
EU ETS regime arose because of the failure of the International Civil Aviation Organisation 
(ICAO) to evolve a global regulatory scheme.
4
  To some, the decision of the Court of Justice 
oŶ the EU ET“ ƌepƌeseŶts a defiŶitiǀe ǀieǁ oŶ the legalitǇ of the EU͛s aŵďitioŶs to uphold 
high environmental standards and to compel others to uphold these standards also.
5
  To 
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 See Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and 
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 See Council Directive 2008/101, 2008 O.J. (L 8) 3 (EC), amending Council Directive 2003/87, 2009 O.J. (L 8) 3 (EC).  
3
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4
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5
 See Joanne Scott & Lavanya Rajamani, EU Climate Change Unilateralism:  International Aviation in the European 
Emissions Trading Scheme, 23 EUR. J. INT͛L L. 469 (2012); Sanja Bogojevic, Legalising Environmental Leadership: A 
 otheƌs, hoǁeǀeƌ, it ƌepƌeseŶts a ŵissed oppoƌtuŶitǇ to pƌoŶouŶĐe upoŶ the Couƌt͛s oǁŶ 
jurisdiction, or to explicitly consider its own contribution to the promotion of global 
standards. 
 
A fuller account of the decision is provided elsewhere in the papers of this symposium;
 6
 
suffice to say that the decision of the Court arose from a high-profile challenge by a range 
of transatlantic private actors, American and Canadian airlines,
7
 via a preliminary reference 
from the English High Court.  The airlines objected principally to the inclusion of aviation 
activities in the EU scheme.
  
They argued, inter alia, that the EU was unlawfully applying EU 
law extra-territorially, thereby exceeding its powers under international law by not 
confining the scheme to European internal flights.  Significantly, it was argued that the 
scheme should have been negotiated and adopted under the International Civil Aviation 




Of particular relevance to the arguments in this Article is the response of the U.S. House of 
Representatives to the EU ETS.  Taking place in the midst of the case before the Court of 
Justice, the American actions set a dramatic context for the litigation.
9
  On 24 October 
2011, several months before the decision of the Court of Justice, the U.S. House of 
Representatives voted to approve the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme 
Prohibition Act of 2011 (hereafter House of Representatives Act of 2011).
10
  The legislation 
directed the Secretary of Transportation to prohibit U.S. aircraft operators from 
participating in the EU ETS.
11
  In so doing, the House of Representatives sought to express 
                                                                                                                
CoŵŵeŶt oŶ the CJEU͛“ ‘uliŶg iŶ C-366/10 on the Inclusion of Aviation in the EU Emissions Trading Scheme, 24 J. 
ENVTL. L. 469 (2012). 
6
 See Theodore Konstadinides, When in Europe:  Customary International Law and EU Competence in the Sphere of 
External Action, 13 GERMAN L.J. ___ (2012).  
7
 Notably, Air Transport Association of America, American Airlines Inc., Continental Airlines Inc., United Airlines 
Inc., Interveners included International Air Transport Association (IATA), National Airlines Council of Canada 
(NACC). 
8
  See supra note 4, at paras. 42-45.  
9
 The Court delivered its decision on 21 December 2011. 
10
 European Union Emissions Trading Scheme Prohibition Act of 2011, H.R. 2594, 112th Cong. (2011).  The bill was 
introduced by Transportation and Infrastructure Committee Chairman J. L. Mica (R-FL), Transportation Committee 
Ranking Member N.J. Rahall (D-WV), Aviation Subcommittee Chairman T. Petri (R-WI), Aviation Subcommittee 
Ranking Member J. Costello (D-IL), and other Members of Congress.  See The EuropeaŶ UŶioŶ͛s EŵissioŶs TradiŶg 
Scheme:  A Violation of International Law, 112th Cong. (2011) (statement of Nancy Young, vice president, 
environmental affairs Air Transport Association), available at 
http://transportation.house.gov/hearings/Testimony.aspx?TID=6834. 
11
 The bill also instructed US officials to negotiate or take any action necessary to ensure US aviation operators are 
not penalized by any unilaterally imposed EU emissions trading scheme.  Under the scheme, any flights into or out 
of an EU airport, regardless of how long that flight is in EU aiƌspaĐe, ǁould ďe suďjeĐt to the pƌogƌaŵ͛s eŵissioŶs 
 its opposition to the obligation on American carriers to comply with EU law on legal and 
economic grounds, arguing that the extra-territorial application of EU rules would costs 
U.S. airlines $3.1 billion in lost revenue between 2012 and 2020.
12
  Ultimately, the Court 
rejected the EU ETS challenge, upholding the exercise of EU regulatory powers.  The 
American and Canadian airlines have subsequently accepted the decision of the Court and 
imposed charges on airline tickets to recoup their costs, thereby resulting in compliance 
ǁith EU laǁ.  IŶ the ǁake of the Couƌt of JustiĐe͛s adǀeƌse decision, which did not expressly 
ƌefeƌ to the ͞pƌohiďitiǀe͟ U.“. AĐt of ϮϬϭϭ, ChiŶa ǁaƌŶed the EU of a looŵiŶg tƌade ǁaƌ.13  
Subsequently, however, Australia joined the EU ETS, and the EU is discussing bilateral deals 
with South Korea, China, Switzerland and California.
14
  As such, the EU ETS litigation 
represents a successful indirect promulgation of global standards through the acceptance 
of EU standards by entities outside the European Union. 
 
The ĐoŶteǆt of the U.“. legislatuƌe͛s ƌetaliatioŶ agaiŶst far-reaching EU regulatory efforts, in 
fact and in law, is surely remarkable, although not unprecedented in recent times.
15
  
Transatlantic actors seem to increasingly deploy law as a political tool.  For example, in 
2011, the United States intervened informally in the formulation of EU legislation,
16
 while 
                                                                                                                
cap and trade requirements.  US airlines would be required to pay an emissions tax to the EU Member State to 
which they most frequently fly.  The US Government also formally objected to the EU ETS.   
12
 See Press Release, Transportation and Infrastructure Committee, Committee, Federal Officials, Aviation & Labor 
Groups United in Opposition to EU Plan to Tax U.S. Air Carriers under Emissions Trading Scheme (July 27, 2011), 
http://transportation.house.gov/news/PRArticle.aspx?NewsID=1369.  
13
 Chinese airlines were being reported to be refusing to pay EU carbon taxes.  See Jonathan Watts, Chinese 
Airlines Refuse to Pay EU Carbon Tax, THE GUARDIAN, Jan. 4, 2012.  Recently, the Chinese Air Transport Association 
was reported to be threatening the EU with counter-measures, such as impounding EU aircraft.  See Alison Leung 
& Anurag Kotoky, China Ready to Impound EU Planes in CO2 Dispute, REUTERS, June 12, 2012.  At the time of 
writing, EU ETS was being discussed in US Senate hearings: Testimony for Senate Committee on Commerce, 
“ĐieŶĐe, aŶd TƌaŶspoƌtatioŶ heaƌiŶg oŶ the EuƌopeaŶ UŶioŶ͛s EŵissioŶs TƌadiŶg “Ǉsteŵ, ϭϭϮth CoŶg. ;ϮϬϭϮͿ 
(statement of Jos Delbeke, Director-General, DG Climate Action, European Commission), available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/clima/news/articles/news_2012060601_en.htm. 
14
 See Benjamin Fox, EU in Talks on More International Emissions Deals, EUOBSERVER, Aug. 29, 2012; Australia to 
JoiŶ EU͛s EŵissioŶ TradiŶg “Ǉsteŵ, EUROACTIV, Aug. 28, 2012. 
15
 See the recent EU-US WTO dispute on Boeing subsidies, displacing through litigation an EU-US Agreement in 
existence.  Appellate Body Report, United States—Measures affecting Trade in Large Civil Aircraft, ¶ 892, 
WT/DS353/AB/R (Mar. 12, 2012).  
16
 See Informal note on Draft EU General Data Protection Regulation (Dec. 2011), available at 
http://edri.org/files/12_2011_DPR_USlobby.pdf: 
This informal note comments on certain aspects of the widely leaked 
dƌaft pƌoposal to ŵodeƌŶize the EuƌopeaŶ UŶioŶ͛s data pƌoteĐtioŶ 
legal framework, and in particular the draft General Data Protection 
‘egulatioŶ ;͞dƌaft ƌegulatioŶ͟Ϳ.  It does Ŷot ŶeĐessaƌilǇ ƌepƌeseŶt the 
views of the US Federal Trade Commission (FTC) any bureau of 
office, or any other US government agency . . . . 
 the EU made amicus curiae submissions before the US Supreme Court in death penalty 
cases.
17
  The extent to which EU legal rules are transplanted or replicated in the United 
States is increasing; one example is the transposition of EU environmental standards into 
CalifoƌŶia͛s laǁs.18  Legal sĐholaƌs ǁƌite of the ͞Bƌussels effeĐt,͟ desĐƌiďiŶg the ƌisiŶg 
influence of EU rules upon U.S. regulatory standards.
19
  The question remains as to how 
these developments influence the Court of Justice and how the EU ETS decision will be 
assessed.  It has been argued that the EU ETS scheme has executive-dominated origins as a 
matter of EU institutional law.
20
  In the post-LisďoŶ TƌeatǇ ĐoŶteǆt, the Couƌt͛s adjudiĐatioŶ 
of an arguably executive-dominated scheme remains significant in light of changes made to 
EU external relations law considered later in detail.  This relationship, between the powers 
of the Court to adjudicate external action, and the interaction between all matters global 
and the EU, including its institutions, is explored here in particular.  
 
The decision of the Court in EU ETS overall does not constitute a conceptual reflection on 
the ͞high politiĐs͟ of the EU ET“ dispute.  The teƌŵ ͞high politiĐs͟ is a teƌŵ usually 
employed more with respect to security, military, or executive matters.  It is used here 
metaphorically to capture the extraordinary global and transatlantic context of the EU ETS 
litigation.
21
  Despite this context, the Court did not explicitly pronounce upon the House of 
Representatives Act of 2011, its own jurisdiction vis-à-ǀis ͞high politiĐs͟ itself, oƌ eǀeŶ EU 
efforts to regulate with de facto global impact.  In fact, the combination of the context of 
the proceedings, the global ambitions of the EU in its EU ETS aviation policies, and the 
actions of the American legislature in the course of the litigation seems to have deterred 
the Couƌt fƌoŵ eŶgagiŶg eǆpƌesslǇ ǁith the ͞high politiĐs͟ of the dispute, i.e. it failed to 
reference the actions of the American legislature or China.  Despite this, it is notable that 
the Court of Justice has considerable external relations powers relative to other 
                                                                                                                
See Francesco Guarascio, US Lobbying Waters Down EU Data Protection Reform, EURACTIV, Feb. 21, 2012; Informal 
Comment on the Draft General Data Protection Regulation and Draft Directive on Data Protection in Law 
Enforcement Investigations (Jan. 2012), available at http://www.edri.org/files/US_lobbying16012012_0000.pdf. 
17
 See e.g., Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005).  See Marise Cremona, 
Values in EU Foreign Policy, in BEYOND THE ESTABLISHED LEGAL ORDERS POLICY INTERCONNECTIONS BETWEEN THE EU AND THE 
REST OF THE WORLD, 275 (Malcolm Evans & Panos Koutrakos eds., 2011). 
18
 See Joanne Scott, From Brussels with Love:  The Transatlantic Travels of European Law and the Chemistry of 
Regulatory Attraction, 57 AM. J. COMP. L. 897 (2009); Yoshiko Naiki, AssessiŶg PoliĐǇ ‘eaĐh:  JapaŶ͛s CheŵiĐal 
PoliĐǇ ‘eforŵ iŶ ‘espoŶse to the EU͛s ‘EACH ‘egulatioŶ, 22 J. OF ENVTL. L. 171 (2010). 
19
 See Anu Bradford, The Brussels Effect, 107 NW. U. L. REV. 1 (2012); see Scott supra note 18. 
20
 See Hans Vedder, International Context of the Emissions Trading Scheme, in BEYOND THE ESTABLISHED LEGAL ORDERS, 
105, 123 (Malcolm Evans and Panos Koutrakos eds., 2011). 
21
 See infra Part C; infra note 47.  
 comparative international courts and even EU Member State Courts.
22
  It is also considered 
to be a powerful judicial entity.
23
  Moreover, the post-Lisbon period has witnessed a 
heightened concern on the part of the Court of Justice as a Court and as a political actor to 
preserve its autonomy inside and outside the courtroom.
24
  The Court is a largely unstudied 
͞aĐtoƌ͟ iŶ aŶalǇses of the aĐtioŶs of the EU iŶ a gloďal ĐoŶteǆt, also kŶoǁŶ as its 
͞aĐtoƌŶess͟ iŶ ŶoŶ-legal literature, denoting its engagement with the world.25  It has never 
enunciated a political question doctrine so as to preclude its own review of political acts in 
EU external relations.
26
  However, on many occasions it has enlarged its own jurisdiction 
beyond the letter of the treaties.
27
  The Couƌt has Ŷot shied aǁaǇ fƌoŵ ͞high politiĐs͟ 
explicitly, nor from dramatic constitutional (r)evolutions.  The response of the Court in the 
EU ET“ deĐisioŶ is a paƌtiĐulaƌlǇ tiŵid oŶe ǁith ƌespeĐt to the ͞high politiĐs͟ of the dispute 
and the objectives of the EU policies, which would on the one hand, eventually launch a 
veritable trade war with China and on the other hand would result in the global adoption 
of EU environmental, legal and political standards by Australia, amongst others.  The failure 
of the Court in the EU ETS decision to engage in a more explicit dialogue with the EU 
legislature is all the more remarkable and will be explored further here.  
 
This AƌtiĐle assesses the Couƌt͛s iŶdiƌeĐt ĐoŶtƌiďutioŶ to the pƌoŵotioŶ of gloďal staŶdaƌds.  
The effects of the EU ETS directive, the decision of the Court, and the actions of the House 
of Representatives are thus considered.  The EU ETS litigation also provides insights as to 
powers of the Court post-Lisbon.  The Article briefly explains the recent EU ETS decision in 
                                            
22
 Or foreign affairs, both terms are used here interchangeably.  The terminology changes reflect contemporary 
scholarship; external relations pre-Lisbon are largely excluded from references to foreign policy, because as Thym 
states, the EU now explicitly acknowledges its engagement in foreign affairs itself.  See Daniel Thym, Foreign 
Affairs, in PRINCIPLES OF EUROPEAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 309, 312 (Armin Von Bogdandy & Jürgen Bast eds., 2nd ed, 
2009).  
23
 See R. DANIEL KELEMEN, EUROLEGALISM:  THE TRANSFORMATION OF LAW AND REGULATION IN THE EU (2011); Daniel 
Kelemen, Eurolegalism and Democracy, 50 J. COMMON MKT. STUD. 55 (2012). 
24
 See Opinion 1/09, Creation of a unified patent litigation system, 2011 E.C.R. I-000; Commission Regulation 
2011/0093, Implementing Enhanced Cooperation in the Area of the Creation of Unitary Patent Protection, 2011 
O.J. (COD); 8th Working Meeting of the CDDH Informal Working Group in the Accession if the European Union to 
the European Convention on Human Rights (CDDH-UE) with the European Commission, CDDH-UE (2011) 16 final 
(July 19, 2011), available at http://www.coe.int/t/dlapil/cahdi/source/Docs%202011/CDDH-
UE_2011_16_final_en.pdf  (last accessed on Nov. 11, 2012); infra Part F. 
25
 This concept is considered in detail in Part F, with reference to the Court.  For a recent analysis of EU 
͞aĐtoƌŶess,͟ see Uǁe WuŶdeƌliĐh, The EU an Actor Sui Generis?  A Comparison of EU and ASEAN Actorness, 50 J. 
COMMON MKT. STUD. 653, 653 (2012).  
26
 See infra Part C. 
27
 On external relations law and the Court, see Pieter Jan Kuijper, Fifty Years of EC/EU External Relations/ 
Continuity and the Dialogue Between/Judges and Member States as Constitutional Legislators, 31 FORDHAM ENVTL. 
L.J. 1571 (2008) and more generally, but notably, Case C-105/03, Criminal Proceedings against Maria Pupino, 2005 
E.C.R. I-5285; Case 294/83, Parti Ecologiste 'Les Verts' v. European Parliament, 1986 E.C.R. 1339. 
 Part B.  Part C then examines the powers of the Court in external relations and their impact 
upon the adjudication undertaken in EU ETS, and Part D explores changes to EU 
institutional law post-Lisbon.  Part E explores the exportation of EU values in EU rule-
making and global standard-setting through law.  Finally, Part F discusses the concept of 
the ͞aĐtoƌŶess͟ of the post-Lisbon Court in global affairs. 
 
B.  Summary of Opinion of Advocate General and Decision of the Grand Chamber  
 
The facts and findings of the EU ETS decision are set out in another account in this special 
issue;
28
 only the key elements of the decision applicable to the present account are set out 
here to provide a background for the discussion in the remaining sections of the Article. 
 
Advocate General Kokott in her Opinion
29
 in the EU ETS decision explicitly rejected the 
claims of the applicants, concluding that the allegation that the scheme had created extra-
territorial rules was based upon an erroneous and highly superficial reading of the 
Directive.
30
  She held that the scheme was ultimately an expression of the principle of 
proportionalitǇ aŶd ƌefleĐted the ͞polluteƌ paǇs͟ pƌiŶĐiple of eŶǀiƌoŶŵeŶtal laǁ, ǁhiĐh did 
not breach any principle of customary international law.
31
  Similarly, the Grand Chamber of 
the Court of Justice rejected the challenge and found no reason to invalidate the provisions 
of the Directive and its scheme.
32
  The Court held that even though the EU ETS rules 
appeared to have the effect of creating obligations only between States, it was 
nevertheless possible that the Directive was liable to create obligations for private actors 
under EU law.
33
  The Court upheld the policy of the objectives of the EU rules on the basis 
of the treaties and agreements to which the EU was a signatory.  The Court held that the 
airlines had chosen to commercially operate within the regulatory space of the EU thus 
subjecting them to EU rules, holding that: 
 
As for the fact that the operator of an aircraft in such a 
situation is required to surrender allowances calculated 
in the light of the whole of the international flight that 
its aircraft has performed . . . the European Union 
legislature may in principle choose to permit a 
                                            
28
 See Konstadinides, supra note 6. 
29
 See Case C-ϯϲϲ/ϭϬ, Aiƌ TƌaŶsp. Ass͛Ŷ of Aŵ. ǀ. “eĐ͛Ǉ of “tate foƌ EŶeƌgǇ and Climate Change, 2011 E.C.R. I-000 
(Opinion of Advocate Gen. Kokott). 
30
 See Id. at para. 144.  
31
 See Id. at para. 160.  
32
 See Case C-ϯϲϲ/ϭϬ, Aiƌ TƌaŶsp. Ass͛Ŷ of Aŵ. ǀ. “eĐ͛Ǉ of “tate foƌ EŶeƌgǇ aŶd Cliŵate ChaŶge, ϮϬϭϭ E.C.‘. I-000. 
33
 See Id. at para. 109. 
 commercial activity . . . only on condition that operators 
comply with the criteria that have been established by 
the European Union . . . in particular where those 
objectives follow on from an international agreement 
to which the European Union is a signatory, such as the 




The Court held that the EU treaties had expressly equipped the EU legislature to legislate 
for a high level of protection of the environment, pursuant to Article 191(2) TFEU, which 
pƌoǀides that ͞UŶioŶ poliĐǇ oŶ the eŶǀiƌoŶŵeŶt shall aiŵ at a high leǀel of pƌoteĐtioŶ.͟35  
The consensual nature of the commercial activity carried out was held to be a key element 
of the regulatory space of the EU, in so far as the airlines chose to operate the EU routes.
36
  
Moreover, there were causal reasons to justify such regulation.  The Court held that EU law 
applied because pollution could partially originate outside the EU.  It stated that ͞ĐeƌtaiŶ 
matters contributing to the pollution of the air, sea or land territory of the Member States 
originate in an event which occurs partly outside that territory is not such as to call into 
question . . . the full applicability of European Union law in that territory . . . .͟37 
 
Notably, both the Advocate General and Court expressly reference the role of failed global 
regulation in the origins of the EU scheme.
38
  In this way, the intent of the EU scheme and 
its intent to serve the same global purpose as the failed international regulations is 
discernible in the decision, but is not substantively discussed beyond a historical form of 
reference.  The Court does not expressly reference the actions of the U.S. legislature in its 
decision, thereďǇ aǀoidiŶg aŶalǇsis of the osteŶsiďlǇ ͞high politiĐs͟ of the dispute.  EƋuallǇ, 
the Court does not refer to the global dispute that the EU ETS ignited, for example, with 
respect to China, on-going at the time of its decision, and the Court does not engage in any 
explicit analysis of the competences of the EU to engage in direct versus indirect global 
action.  Nor does the Court expressly reference the difference between the judicial review 
of the Directive (which it conducted in the EU ETS case) and review of an international 
agreement (which it did not conduct, because the EU ETS was developed in the form of a 
Directive).  
 
                                            
34
 Id. at para. 128 (emphasis added).  Note, however, that this does not apply to the Chicago Convention, which 
did not bind the European Union. 
35
 Id. at para. 191. 
36
 See the emphasis on full applicability of EU law or competence in id. at paras. 129–30.  
37
 Id. at para. 129.  Notably, in the judgment of the Court, the Court drew upon the wording of the Open Skies 
Agreement to broaden the range of applicants to include aircraft.  Id. at paras. 134–35. 
38
 See Id. at para. 33; id. at para. 191 (Opinion of Advocate General Kokott). 
 Accordingly, the decision ostensibly raises more questions than it answers and most of 
these questions relate to the manner in which the Court as an actor adjudicates this 
controversial dispute.  This account considers such questions, and reflects next on the 
powers of the Court as an actor in external relations generally, in ex post and ex ante 
judicial review.  Part C considers how the EU ETS might have been reviewed had the 
decision of the Court been in the form of ex ante review. 
 
C.  Reflections on the Power(s) of the Court of Justice in External Relations 
 
The Court of Justice characterized the inclusion of aviation within the EU ETS regime as a 
wholly internal EU matter.
39
  However, the global impact and genesis of the EU rules 
themselves suggest otherwise.  The role of the Court of Justice in adjudicating the EU 
external aĐtioŶ aŶd hoǁ ͞poǁeƌful͟ the Couƌt is iŶ foƌeigŶ affaiƌs siŵpliciter, relative to 
other courts and tribunals, is worthy of consideration.  How do its powers to adjudicate EU 
external action impact upon its adjudication of rules such as EU ETS, ex post facto?  The 
role of the Court of Justice in foreign affairs or external relations is both a legal and political 
question which has attracted little interest from scholars of political science and 
international relations studying the Court of Justice.
40
  The Court is regarded as having 
negligible influence on EU foreign policy generally.  Amongst legal scholars, the height of 
criticism of EU external relations law, for example, has been that it is extraordinarily 
esoteric and technocratic, mired in disputes about pillars and competence, devoid of 
constitutionalism in a broad sense.
41
  Post-Lisbon, the Court lacks jurisdiction in the realm 
of Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), notwithstanding its new jurisdiction over 
the unified Area of Freedom, Security and Justice.
42
  Scholars are divided on the 
significance of this state of affairs, given the manner in which the Court has evolved its own 
jurisdiction in the past.
43
 
                                            
39
 Which one can infer directly from its decision upholding the Directive simplicter, rejecting the suggestion that it 
was an extra-territorial application of EU law.  
40
 See Geoffrey Garrett, The Politics of Legal Integration in the European Union, 49 INT͚L ORG. 171, 178 (1995); 
Walter Mattli & Anne Marie Slaughter, Law and Politics in the European Union:  A Reply to Garrett, 49 INT͚L ORG. 
183, 185 (1995); Walter Mattli & Anne Marie Slaughter, Revisiting the European Court of Justice, 52 INT͚L ORG 177, 
180 (1998); Alex Stone Sweet & Thomas L. Brunell, Constructing a Supranational Constitution:  Dispute Resolution 
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As a matter of law, however, this disinterest or critique is not justified.  As Kuijper states, 
the entire evolution of EU external relations law has been marked by a dynamic 
interpretation by the Court of Justice of its legal powers, with ebbs and flows.
44
  In reality, 
the Court of Justice has extensive powers of judicial review in this field.  Most remarkable 
are its powers to give a binding opinion on the legality of international agreements entered 
into by the EU pursuant to Article 218(11) TFEU.
45
  These powers are in the form of ex ante 
abstract review rather than concrete ex post review.  The powers are extensive given that 
many legal orders do not allow Courts to engage in abstract review of foreign affairs.
46
  For 
example, the political question doctrine precludes such review under U.S. constitutional 
law.
47
  The Court of Justice itself has never explicitly enunciated a political question 
doctrine, although as Thym outlines, there are many Advocate General opinions expressing 
considerably divergent views on this issue.
48
  Theƌe aƌe soŵe ǁho Đoŵpaƌe the Couƌt͛s laĐk 
of jurisdiction in CFSP matters to the political question doctrine, but the Court itself is not 
the origin of this jurisdictional exclusion.
49
  As ƌegaƌds this aďstƌaĐt ƌeǀieǁ, the Couƌt͛s 
powers of ex ante review have rarely been used and represent a miniscule portion of its 
work.
50
  For example, one such Opinion was given in 2009
51
 and again in 2011,
52
 out of a 
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 total of approximately 600 cases in each year.
53
  The legality of a draft international 
agreement can be challenged before the Court of Justice by way of its jurisdiction to give 
an opinion ex ante according to Article 218(11) TFEU.
54
  This ex ante review is justified on 
the basis of the involvement of third parties.
55
  Schütze states that ex post review could 
negate the external effects of an agreement on such parties.
56
  Additionally, inter-
institutional competence disputes can be more swiftly resolved ex ante.  Another view, 
however, is that the consequences of ex post review in EU law are detrimental to the 
iŶteƌests of the EU, seeŵiŶglǇ giǀiŶg it juƌisdiĐtioŶ oǀeƌ ďoth ͞high͟ aŶd ͞loǁ͟ politiĐs iŶ a 
vast range of areas.  In this regard, Koutrakos emphasizes how the consequences of judicial 
decisions in EU external relations can be peculiarly awkward or complex—a reason often 
provided for the application of the political question doctrine in other legal orders.
57
  In its 
controversial judgment on Passenger Name Records,
58
 where the Parliament had initially 
requested an opinion but withdrew its request and instead took an annulment action 
under Article 263 TFEU, the consequences of the decision of the Court annulling the 
agreement on competence grounds did not result in a revised finalized immediate 
agreement—as international agreements take time to be renegotiated.59  Instead, the 
resulting interim agreement was a better bargain for the United States, but not the EU, 
ǁhiĐh iƌoŶiĐallǇ had to ͞ďeg͟ the United States to sign.60  If the Court had annulled the 
amendments to the EU ETS Directive, it would have weakened the EU policy and generated 




On another view, in light of the tremendous legal consequences of the decision for third 
parties, especially private actors, had EU ETS been put in place by an international 
agreement, it might have benefitted from judicial review, ex ante, thereby providing for 
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 legal certainty.  The EU ETS litigation represents a case study of the use of law generating—
rather than reducing or managing—uncertainty.62  The choice by the EU to regulate such a 
high level of protection for the environment and to bring global climate change within the 
realm of its own legal order clearly represented a highly ambitious effort effectively to 
regulate the international aviation industry through EU law.  This use of its regulatory 
powers circumvents the legal issues associated with the negotiation of an international 
agreement, such as ratification in the Member States.
63
  Nonetheless, the EU ETS decision 
emphasizes the benefits of ex ante review:  avoiding adverse effects on the rights of third 
parties, eliminating the renegotiation of agreements, and avoiding political judgments on 
sensitive matters of external policy.  Ex ante and ex post facto judicial review represent 
highly polarized means of considering foreign relations.  EU ETS clearly was not reviewed in 
the form of an international agreement, and the controversy it attracted perhaps outlines 
the benefits of ex ante review.  
 
In addition to the different postures of judicial review, whether ex ante or ex post, the 
institutional context of EU external relations post-Lisbon is also relevant to a consideration 
of the powers and actions of the Court.  The following section further explores this 
institutional context. 
 
D.  The Institutional Dynamics of EU-External Relations Post-Lisbon:  The Context of EU 
ETS for the Court 
 
Vedder has described how the breadth of the EU Energy and Climate Package, including 
aǀiatioŶ iŶ the EU ET“, eǆposes the EU͛s ďƌoad eǆteƌŶal aŵďitioŶs.64  He outlines how the 
EuƌopeaŶ CouŶĐil agƌeed upoŶ the paĐkage ͞despite͟ the theŶ appliĐaďle Đo-decision 
procedure, envisaging decision-making by the Commission and Council, not the European 
Council.
65
  Vedder thus argues that the genesis of EU ETS was executive-dominated.  He 
emphasizes the central role of the Commission in the drafting and implementation of the 
DiƌeĐtiǀe, aŶ iŶstitutioŶ ͞aĐtiǀe͟ iŶ EU eǆteƌŶal relations, further providing evidence of the 
external aspects of the Directive.  He also suggests that the EU support for the Kyoto 
Protocol in its EU ETS scheme emphasizes EU support of international commitments in this 
area:  but diametrically opposed to the prevailing U.S. position on climate change and the 
Kyoto Protocol, but at the center of international law and policy on climate change.  Such a 
viewpoint possibly underscores why the Court of Justice would not want to annul the EU 
ETS, nor pronounce upon the larger real politic of the dispute.  EU ETS evidently straddles 




 A fuller discussion of mixed external action and membership of international organisations is set out in 
Eeckhout, supra note 50. 
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 global and internal objectives, with an arguably more significant external impact.  Vedder 
thus raises an important question as to whether EU External action is in reality executive-
dominated post-Lisbon so as to preclude strong judicial review by the Court of Justice. 
 
The judiciary aside, the institutional dynamic of EU foreign or external relations law seems 
fluid and evolving post-Lisbon.  For example, the teething difficulties surrounding the 
evolving operations of the EU External Action Service support this viewpoint.
66
  Moreover, 
Schütze contends that the Council is not primus inter pares with the Parliament but instead 
is primus in relation to the negotiation of international agreements, and thus executive-
dominant.
67
  Pursuant to Article 218(3) TFEU, the Council shall authorize the opening of 
international relations negotiations, adopt negotiating directives and may authorize the 
signing and conclusion of agreements.
68
  As Eeckhout states, this process excludes the 
European Parliament.
69
  Post-Lisbon, however, the European Parliament has powers of 
consent to approve international agreements in a wide variety of circumstances, pursuant 
to Article 218(6)(a) TFEU.
70
  Pursuant to the Inter-Institutional Framework Agreement, the 
CoŵŵissioŶ shall take due aĐĐouŶt of the PaƌliaŵeŶt͛s ĐoŵŵeŶts thƌoughout the 
negotiations.
71
  Historically, the European Parliament has used its consent powers as 
͞delaǇ͟ poǁeƌs aŶd suĐh poǁeƌs haǀe eǀolǀed thƌough the treaties into more substantive 
legal powers.
72
  Hoǁeǀeƌ, soŵe suggest that theƌe aƌe liŵits to the PaƌliaŵeŶt͛s 
empowerment in foreign affairs, relying upon the acceptance by the Parliament of the 
latest EU-U.S. Passenger Name Records Agreement despite its shortcomings in the area of 
civil liberties.
73
  “uĐh ĐoŶĐlusioŶs ŵaǇ Ŷeed ƌeǀisioŶ iŶ light of the PaƌliaŵeŶt͛s ƌejeĐtioŶ of 
a significant international treaty, the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Act (ACTA), in 2012 on 
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 fundamental rights grounds.
74
  Evidently, a new inter-institutional dynamic in EU External 
Relations is taking effect, with more actors increasingly empowered and having incentives 
to litigate to enhance or evolve their powers.  The new institutional constellation of EU 
Foreign Relations law might suggest that the Court would want to discourage overreach on 
the part of the EU institutions in foreign relations or to encourage certain actors to protect 
their interests, for example, the Parliament.  This does not seem to be evident in any way 
in the EU ETS decision.  
 
Undoubtedly, the evolving state of EU institutional law in foreign relations might be seen 
to iŶflueŶĐe the ǀieǁ the Couƌt takes of the EU͛s iŵpaĐt upoŶ gloďal staŶdaƌds thƌough its 
regulatory efforts.  On another view, an executive-dominated Agreement might not 
represent an appropriate case for the Court to indicate the acceptable limits of EU 
regulatory powers with foreign policy implications.  Also, the role of the type of private 
actors involved in the EU ETS perhaps complicated the litigation.  Non-EU North American 
aiƌliŶes Đould ďe desĐƌiďed as ĐlassiĐ ͞ƌepeat plaǇeƌs,͟75 with the capacity to litigate 
tenaciously to protect their economic interests.  Overall, it seems that the post-Lisbon 
institutional structure did not have any obvious or apparent relevance to this litigation.  
Indeed, the Court might be perceived as not having availed itself of the opportunity to 
develop its jurisprudence here or to pronounce on the broader relationship between the 
EU͛s gloďal aŶd iŶteƌŶal iŶteƌests. 
 
Beyond institutional power structures, normative questions surrounding the promotion of 
EU values through law are addressed here next, considering EU and global standard 
setting, followed by an analysis of the concept of setting high standards in rule-making. 
 
E.  EU and Global Rule-Making:  Standards by and Through Law 
 
I.  EU aŶd Gloďal ͞“taŶdard-“ettiŶg͟ Through Laǁ 
 
The attempt by the EU to maximize its influence on global climate change policy through 
law in EU ETS—by setting very high regulatory standards and subjecting a vast range of 
actors to its values—is remarkable but not necessarily extraordinary.  The EU frequently 
imports values and norms in law, but often also acts itself as an international model for 
values.
76
  Equally, the EU has sought to apply its rules extra-territorially in various 
                                            
74
 EP, first reading, EP-PE_TC1-COD(2005)0127; P7_TA(2010)0432, European Parliament resolution of 24 
November 2010 on the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA). 
75
 See Marc Galanter, Why the Haves Come Out Ahead:  Speculations on the Limits of Legal Change, 9 LAW & SOC͚Y 
REV. 95, 98 (1974). 
76
 See CREMONA, supra note 17, at 285.  From a vast number, two of the prominent examples of importation might 
be the European Convention on Human Rights or the Geneva Convention on the status of refugees.  See Marise 
Cremona, The European Union as a Global Actor:  Roles, Models and Identity, 41 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 553 (2004). 
 instances, including rules with penalties, as in the case of EU competition law.
77
  Article 
21(2)(h) TEU expressly provides that the EU seeks to promote good global governance.
78
  
However, Cremona has demonstrated how the importation and exportation of values in EU 
foreign policy through law is highly fluid.
79
  For example, the EU has suspended trade 
agreements on fundamental rights grounds only in a minority of instances.
80
  EU foreign 
policy may be characterized by precarious commitments made by the EU to the spread of 
its own values.  EU environmental law standards have been transposed in various forms all 
around the globe, for example, into Japanese and Californian law.
81
  The EU ETS litigation is 
not an example of the adoption by a third country of EU values but instead an ultimately 
successful promulgation of values with global effects.  The controversy created by the EU 
ETS also emphasizes how much in flux EU values are, without any palpable judicial activism.  
The Couƌt͛s Ŷotoƌious deĐisioŶ iŶ the pƌe-Lisbon Environmental Crimes case held that EU 
environmental law could deploy criminal penalties to enhance its effectiveness, beyond the 
letter of the treaties, a not uncontroversial evolution of the treaties.
82
  EU ETS represents a 
remarkably successful exportation of EU values, to a point.  However, in all, EU ETS 
represents a major success on the part of the EU to regulate where other global 





II.  High and Higher:  EU and Global Standards of Rule-Making 
 
The EU ETS aviation rules represent an effort by the EU to engage in rulemaking or 
standard setting, with effects upon actors and standards outside the EU.  Rulemaking 
eŶhaŶĐes the EU͛s staŶĐe as aŶ eŶtitǇ that Đould set eǆeŵplaƌǇ goals ǁith ǁide ƌegulatoƌǇ 
effects and extend both its legal and political reach beyond what would be possible 
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 through ordinary international legal instruments.  The EU ETS rules enacted were thus EU 
rules with global ambitions.  However, to describe laws or rules as global themselves is not 
an uncontroversial exercise, given that it denotes a shift in the center of political authority, 
as well as a shift in the structure of the legal order.
84
  Global rules might be seen to result 
from political deterritorialization but it is a highly contested field.
85
  A feature of 
contemporary global rule making is that it is mired in a quest for legitimacy, and even 
perfection, and seeks to promulgate extraordinarily high standards.  EU law and policy is 
replete with examples of such rules laden in superlatives are plentiful; for example, striving 
to be the best, the global leader, the world standard.  The Lisbon Agenda,
86
 its successor 
Europe 2020,
87 
the European Research Area,
88
 the goal to eradicate of poverty in Article 3 
TEU,
89
 or the architecture of the new European system of financial supervision all provide 
extensive evidence of this.
90
  The EU ETS rules were explicitly intended as a cornerstone of 
the European Union's policy to combat climate change and its key tool for reducing 
industrial greenhouse gas emissions cost-effeĐtiǀelǇ as the ͞fiƌst aŶd ďiggest iŶteƌŶatioŶal 
sĐheŵe foƌ the tƌadiŶg of gƌeeŶhouse gas eŵissioŶ alloǁaŶĐes.͟91  Yet it cannot be argued 
that such rulemaking is inevitably doomed to fail on account of its high objectives.  In the 
eǀeŶt of ͞failuƌe,͟ the EU has siŵplǇ stƌiǀed foƌ eǀeŶ higheƌ goals, as a ĐoŵpaƌisoŶ of 
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 Europe 2020 with its predecessor, the Lisbon agenda, suggests.
92
  On the contrary, global 
rulemaking, however imperfect, illegitimate, undesirable, or far-reaching, can still function 
well.
93
  As KƌisĐh states, ͞failed͟ eǆaŵples of Gloďal GoǀeƌŶaŶĐe aƌe iŶ highlǇ teĐhŶiĐal aŶd 
specialist regulatory fields such as environment and safety where technical and/or mutual 
recognition problems across regimes thwart the success of programs like genetically 
modified organisms (GMOs).
94
  The analysis of the legitimacy of global rulemaking usually 
advocates the infusion of fundamental rights iŶto suĐh ƌuleŵakiŶg suĐh as PeteƌsŵaŶŶ͛s 
famous advocacy for the use of Fundamental Rights in WTO law or the Manifesto for Social 
Justice in European Contract Law.
95
  The invocation of fundamental rights in this way 
usuallǇ ƌelates to a desiƌe toǁaƌds ͞ǁelfare-ŵaǆiŵized͟ ƌuleŵakiŶg.  Aside fƌoŵ the aiŵs 
or legitimacy of global rulemaking, the barriers for individual litigants of global rulemaking 
are frequently high, as they sometimes face highly esoteric legal procedures.
96
  Moreover, 
unintended legal consequences of global rulemaking can have higher stakes.  For example, 
the EU ETS litigation concerned billions of euros of lost revenue, although in that case 
consumers ended up absorbing those costs.  
  
The House of Representatives Act of 2011 passed by the U.S. House of Representatives 
clearly marks the EU ETS saga as one of the most controversial global regulatory disputes 
of modern times.  The regulatory capacity of the EU to generate the litigation in the first 
place is particularly remarkable, showing the pƌeĐaƌious ͞uŶdeƌďellǇ͟ of gloďal ƌegulatoƌǇ 
ambitions.  The rulemaking by the EU impacted so adversely on private American 
commercial actors that it generated EU-based litigation by such parties and also legislative 
action to prohibit the impact of EU law in the United States.  While there are some historic 
precedents for U.S. disquiet towards EU regulation being expressed by and through law, 
the type of legislative response and form of litigation before the Court of Justice is highly 
distinct.
97
  The nature, scope, and consequences of the EU ETS rules provide clear evidence 
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 of the precarious nature of standard setting on such a scale, i.e., EU qua global rulemaking.  
Precedent suggests, however, that any defects or deficiencies in the rules or their adoption 
processes do not necessarily act as a deterrent to further EU (legislative) action, but rather 
as a propellant for further, more ambitious action.   
 
The final Part assesses the Couƌt of JustiĐe as aŶ ͞aĐtoƌ͟ iŶ gloďal affaiƌs, ĐoŶsideƌiŶg 
scholarship eǆaŵiŶiŶg EU ͞aĐtoƌŶess͟ iŶ gloďal affaiƌs. 
 
F.  The ͞AĐtorŶess͟ of the Court of JustiĐe Post-Lisbon in Global Affairs:  Sui Generis 
Actor, in Theory and Practice? 
 
There is little doubt but that the EU itself increasingly acts as a powerful actor in global 
affairs, both politically and legally.  However, as Jupille and Caporaso state, there is no 
consensus in scholarship on what it means to be an actor, despite its centrality to 
discussions on power and influence and as regards the EU, similar problems bedevil its 
characterization as an entity.
98
  The ͞aĐtoƌŶess͟ of the EU is assessed uŶeǀeŶlǇ ďǇ ;ŶoŶ-
legal) scholars and is usually treated as a special case, or sui generis, on account of its 
ŶoǀeltǇ aŶd its ĐoŵpleǆitǇ.  The Đƌiteƌia of ͞aĐtoƌŶess͟ used to ĐoŶsider the international 
actions of the EU include, inter alia, the de facto or de jure recognition of its actions, the 
legal authority to act, its institutional autonomy or distinctiveness, and the cohesion 
between the EU and its Member States in the formulation of policy.
99
  Notable studies of 
EU ͞aĐtoƌŶess͟ iŶ aŶ iŶteƌŶatioŶal ĐoŶteǆt foĐus upoŶ the EU iŶstitutioŶs geŶeƌiĐallǇ aŶd 
largely have not considered the Court of Justice as relevant.
100
  There are various views on 
how sophisticated and coherent the foreign policy action of the EU is, depending upon the 
policy in question.
101
  Either way, the concept usually depicts EU interactions with the 
wider world, but does not include the Court of Justice.  The Court of Justice is not an 
organization per se and instead is only part of an international organization.
102
  However, it 
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 is very significant that the Court of Justice is perceived as a very powerful judicial entity, so 
much so as to distinguish the EU from typical international organizations.
103
  It is 
considered to be such a powerful actor that Kelemen argued it contributed to a new form 
of judiĐialized goǀeƌŶaŶĐe iŶ the EU, ͞Euƌolegalisŵ,͟ ďased upoŶ its ƌole iŶ the “iŶgle 
Market.
104
  Thus, while there has been much study on the role of the Court in internal EU 
integration, its external impact on global affairs is perceived as negligible, despite 
theoretical and perhaps practical indications to the contrary.  When one reflects on the 
Đƌiteƌia used to ŵeasuƌe EU ͞aĐtoƌŶess,͟—for example, recognition, authority, 
autonomy,
105—it can readily be asserted that the Court is an internationally recognized 
judicial institution.  As its interactions with the European Court of Human Rights suggests 
(i.e., It is cited in European Court of Human Rights decisions, even pre-Lisbon), it has legal 
authority to deliver decisions from the EU treaties in the field of EU external relations and 
is autonomous or legally distinct from other EU institutions, pursuant to the treaties.  Thus, 
it is argued here that the Court of Justice can be said to haǀe seǀeƌal ͞aĐtoƌŶess͟ 
characteristics at the very least. 
 
In practice, the post-Lisbon period has witnessed a heightened concern on the part of the 
Court of Justice as a Court and as a political actor to preserve its autonomy inside and 
outside the courtroom.
106
  There are two particularly striking examples of this.  First is the 
recent EU Patent Court decision, where the Court annulled a Patent Court system that 
would have eroded its own autonomy.
107
  Another example is the negotiations surrounding 
the European Convention on Human Rights accession, where it successfully negotiated for 
a judge from the Court of Justice of the European Union to sit on the bench of the 
European Court of Human Rights.
108
  The Patents Court decision caused considerable 
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 political difficulties and added further delay to the efforts of the EU and its Member States 
to evolve its patent law system.
109
  The ECHR negotiations have had a particularly long 
duration—almost three years after the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, accession is 
still not complete, with considerable implications, although the Court cannot be said to be 
singularly responsible for the overall delay.
110
  These iŶstaŶĐes eŵphasize the Couƌt͛s 
concern for the autonomy of EU law in a legal and political context, both inside and outside 
the courtroom.  They also emphasize a desire to engage as an actor in a political process, 
where its own jurisdiction is at stake, as well as the interactions of the EU externally in 
aŶotheƌ legal sǇsteŵ.  The Couƌt͛s juƌisdiĐtioŶ was increased by the Treaty of Lisbon to 
include the Area of Freedom, Security, and Justice, (AFSJ),
111
 but is subject to an important 
five-year transition period, which precludes legality review or preliminary references in this 
area.
112
  This is significant as the AFSJ increasingly has a significant external relations law 
component and this exclusion impedes the full unity of its jurisdiction in this field.  The 
Couƌt͛s ͞aĐtoƌŶess͟ Ƌualities ǁould ďe eŶhaŶĐed ďǇ its iŶǀolǀeŵeŶt iŶ this seŶsitiǀe field.  
Nonetheless, the Court remains a comparatively powerful judicial actor overall in EU law. 
 
As regards International Law, Eeckhout argues that the Court has become less receptive 
towards international law in the last decade.
113
  He demonstrates that, in much of its case 
law on bilateral free trade, cooperation, and association agreements, the Court has never 
decided against direct effect simpliciter.
114
  To put it another way, the great majority of 
agreements that have come before the Court have been recognized as having direct effect 
by the Court, indicating its desire to apply its own procedures to external legal 
instruments.
115
  Many argue that the landmark decision of the Court of Justice in Kadi et al 
v. Council and Commission, where the Court reviewed the effects of a UN Security Council 
Resolution and sanctions adopted in accordance with EU law values and rules, constitutes a 
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 sui generis approach to International law.
116
  As is well known, the Court there delivered its 
landmark decision on the effects of international law within the European legal order, 
purporting to establish a form of European exceptionalism, or at least a particular 
relationship with other legal orders.  The expansion of international rulemaking has had a 
distinct impact on the constitutional law of European foreign affairs.
117
  Thym describes the 
pre-LisďoŶ deĐade as a peƌiod of ͞ĐoŶstitutioŶal ĐoŶsolidatioŶ.͟118  During this period, the 
Court attempted to accentuate the relevance of the Member States in foreign affairs and 
to delineate the constitutional limitations of EU action.  In this light, Kadi provides a 
ƌeŵiŶdeƌ of the eǀolǀiŶg Ŷatuƌe of the Couƌt͛s ͞aĐtoƌŶess.͟  The ͞aĐtoƌŶess͟ of the Couƌt iŶ 
Global Governance thus seems quite apparent from more recent developments, inside and 
outside the courtroom (e.g., ECHR negotiations), but is not evident in EU ETS.  The EU ETS 
decision seems far from convincing in the post-Lisbon context, where the Court is engaging 
more vividly with international law, for example, ECHR accession or, pre-Lisbon, in its Kadi 
decision.  In practice, the EU ETS decision aside, the Court seems to display more rather 
than less of a desire to act as a global actor, both in its case law and outside the courtroom. 
 
G.  Conclusion 
 
By upholding the amendment to the Directive in the EU ETS decision to include aviation, 
the Court indirectly contributed to far-reaching EU regulatory ambitions.  The result of the 
decision seems to be that the EU effectively regulates the global standards in this field 
through EU law, given the rising global adoption of the EU law standards.  The approval of 
the EU ETS regime thus represents an important exportation of EU values through law.  
Equally, the House of Representatives Act of 2011 passed by the U.S. House of 
Representatives is a vivid reminder of how controversial the EU ETS saga was, and 
demonstrates how the Grand Chamber supported tremendous regulatory reach on the 
part of the EU.  The decision of the Court does not engage explicitly with the challenges 
posed by the political context of the proceedings and actors of non-EU actors.  The 
supposedly executive-dominant context of EU ETS does not feature in the dispute.  The EU 
ETS decision does not constitute a convincing analysis of its vivid context and instead 
appears both timid and brusque.  Given the stature of the Court, it is remarkable that the 
Court in the EU ETS case did not consider the relationship between the EU ETS and the 
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 post-Lisbon EU as a global actor.  The EU ETS litigation also exposes the dynamic landscape 
of transatlantic relations through and by law.  However, the manner in which the U.S. 
airlines ultimately succumb to EU jurisdictional rules despite the legislative support 
received by them in the United States iŶdiĐates ďoth the ͞high politiĐs͟ aŶd Ŷaƌƌoǁ 
parameters of global governance battles.  The Court has acted to protect its own integrity 
and autonomy both inside and outside the courtroom post-LisďoŶ.  The ͞iŶside-out͟ 
component of EU external values seems to have a consistently tricky relationship with the 
͞outside-in͟ (i.e., all things global, as the EU ETS saga emphasizes.  The Court will no doubt 
evolve and develop this relationship more explicitly over time. 
